Abstract. Several studies have emphasized a slow price adjustment to reported insider trades for Germany. The results presented in this paper, though, show that this is mainly caused by a subset of high arbitrage risk stocks. In fact, the abnormal return difference between the quintiles of stocks with highest and lowest idiosyncratic risk is in the range of 2.99-4.90% over a 20-day interval. These results are robust even in the context of a joint generalized least squares approach. By developing a simple zero-investment arbitrage trading strategy mimicking insider trades, it turns out that such a trading strategy, in most cases, generates significant positive returns as long as transaction costs are neglected. However, the outperformance disappears in all risk quintiles, if bid/ask spreads are taken into account. We conclude that the market's under-reaction to reported insider trades can mainly be explained by the cost of risky arbitrage and is therefore not exploitable.
INTRODUCTION
According to well-documented empirical evidence, company insiders exploit their informational advantage when trading in their own company's stocks. 1 While it is not surprising that insiders benefit from their informational advantage, it would be against the notion of efficient capital markets if outsiders, by mimicking published insider transactions, could earn excess 1. Chang and Suk (1998) , Jeng et al. (2003) and others report such results for the United States.
For the United Kingdom, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) document similar and more pronounced findings. First empirical and corresponding evidence for Germany exists, for example, from Betzer and Theissen (2009) .
corollary, we hypothesize that arbitrage risk is negatively related to the speed of price adjustment after reported corporate dealings. These findings extend a recently evolved strand of literature, in which it is pointed out that some market anomalies can perfectly be explained once the role of idiosyncratic risk in arbitrage strategies is understood.
5 Mashruwala et al. (2006) , for example, show that the so-called accrual anomaly is concentrated in stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. Mendenhall (2004) reports similar results for the postearnings announcement drift and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) for the index effect. Similarly, Pontiff (1996) argues that closed-end fund's mispricing may be caused by arbitrage risk and Ali et al. (2003) show that the well-known book-to-market effect is related to idiosyncratic risk. 6 In the context of directors ' dealings, Ben-David and Roulstone (2007) show that the returns to insiders are positively related to the level of arbitrage risk.
We extend this line of research and make two distinct contributions to the existing literature. First, this paper extends the findings of Ben-David and Roulstone (2007) by exploring the relationship between arbitrage risk and abnormal returns to outsiders mimicking published insider transactions. Second, we scrutinize the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and transaction costs. As arbitrage risk is supposed to increase transaction costs, we hypothesize that an appropriately defined arbitrage strategy generates lower returns than is suggested by looking at abnormal returns only. As a corollary, we examine several other potential determinants of returns to directors' dealings that have previously been neglected. In particular, we control for the opportunity cost of capital, direct and indirect transaction costs, and financial distress.
Similarly to existing research, we report abnormal returns of 1.46% ( À 1.87%) and 1.99% ( À 3.12%) in the 10 and 20 days after the reporting of insider purchases (sales), respectively. While our results confirm the existence of large and statistically significant postannouncement abnormal returns, we also demonstrate that outsiders will hardly be able to profit from mimicking insider trades. By sorting insider trades in relation to their level of arbitrage risk, we show that large abnormal returns cluster in highly idiosyncratic stocks. In fact, the return difference between the quintiles with highest and lowest idiosyncratic risk is significant at the 1% level and equal to 2.99% (2.33%) and 4.90% (3.88%) in the ten and 20 days after the reporting of insider purchases (sales), respectively. Moreover, our crosssectional regression approach confirms that idiosyncratic risk is positively and robustly related to abnormal returns. These results are robust even if potential cross-sectional dependence of abnormal returns is taken into 5. For an overview on this line of argument, cf. Schwert (2004) . 6. For a more extensive overview on this specific strand of the literature, cf. Pontiff (2006, p. 45) .
account, as can be shown in the context of a joint generalized least squares approach. Furthermore, we develop a simple zero-investment arbitrage trading strategy, where insider purchases (sales) are mimicked by taking a long (short) position in the company's stock and market risk is eliminated by an offsetting short (long) position in the market index. It turns out that such a trading strategy in most of the cases generates significant positive returns as long as transaction costs are neglected. These returns, again, are highest for the stocks with highest arbitrage risk. In fact, the investment strategy in the highest arbitrage risk quintile generates a significant outperformance of 2.41% of the assumed long position for all trade types. However, the outperformance totally disappears in all risk quintiles, if bid/ask spreads are taken into account. Finally, we present some weak evidence that the profitability of such a zero-investment trading strategy has decreased over time.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the institutional background of directors' dealings in Germany and gives a brief overview of the existing literature. Section 3 describes the dataset and Section 4 discusses the research design and results. Section 5 concludes.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE
According to §15a of the Security Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz), insiders have to report all trades to Germany's financial services authority (BaFin) and to the company itself within five business days. 7 The law defines company insiders as members of the executive and supervisory board, as well as the respective spouses, relatives of first-degree and legal entities owned or controlled by company insiders. Other employees have no obligation to report as long as they have no managerial function. In contrast to the US and UK, major shareholders and former directors are exempted from the reporting obligation. Furthermore, insiders may refrain from reporting their trades if the cumulative trading volume does not exceed 5,000 euros in one calendar year. 8 To the best of our knowledge, eight studies have been conducted on directors' dealings in Germany. Rau (2004) , Heidorn et al. (2004) and Stotz (2006) examine the market's reaction to insider transactions. Tebroke and Wollin (2005) study the determinants of abnormal returns such as firm size and the transaction volume of insider trades. Betzer and Theissen (2009) 7. This ruling became effective on 1 July 2002. Before the Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz (AnSVG), which became effective on 30 October 2004, trades had to be reported without delay. This vague definition caused long reporting delays and was therefore replaced. The reader should note, moreover, that insider trading based on private information has been illegal in Germany since 1994. 8. Before the AnSVG, trades were exempt from the reporting obligation if the cumulated trading volume did not surpass 25,000 euros in 30 days.
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r 2009 The Authors Journal Compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009 extend this line of research by controlling for the firm's ownership structure. Klinge et al. (2005) take event clustering into account and use nonoverlapping observations. Dymke and Walter (2008) investigate the exploitation of private information by insiders, and Betzer and Theissen (2008) research the relationship between excess returns and reporting delay. All studies agree that postannouncement price effects of insider trades are statistically significant and more pronounced in Germany than in the US. In addition, abnormal returns accumulate over time. These findings are not in accordance with the existence of an informational efficient capital market in the sense put forward by Fama (1970) . Although we corroborate these findings, it is the main contribution of this paper to show that this effect is not exploitable because of the existence of transaction costs and, more generally, arbitrage risk. Hence, the market seems to be efficient in the spirit of the definition proposed by Jensen (1978) .
Of course, mispriced securities offer market participants the opportunity to earn risk-free profits by engaging in arbitrage trades. An arbitrage trade in its original sense entails going long (short) in an underpriced (overpriced) asset and short (long) in a perfect substitute to hedge against changes in fundamental value. No net investment is required and profits are earned once the mispricing disappears. Arbitrage is, however, not as straightforward as the outlined trading strategy suggests. In practice, arbitrage is costly because arbitrageurs incur transaction and holding costs.
Holding costs accumulate over time and are proportionate to the investment horizon. They include the opportunity cost of capital and costs arising out of shorting an asset. Besides short-selling constraints that make shorting risky, arbitrageurs may not receive full interest on short-sale proceeds.
9 More importantly, holding costs include arbitrage risk, which arises out of imperfectly hedging the fundamental risk associated with the mispriced security.
It is widely accepted that arbitrage risk is the most important cost traders face.
10 If arbitrageurs can perfectly hedge a mispriced security's fundamental value, the mispricing will disseminate over time, resulting in a risk-free profit. If, however, few good substitutes exist and the hedge is imperfect, arbitrageurs will be subject to idiosyncratic risk. As a result, traders will also suffer from mispricing risk as the mispricing might strengthen further in the short-term before the security's price converges to its fair value. This may force the arbitrageur to unwind prematurely the trading position and incur a loss (cf. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Tuckman and Vila, 1992) . Thus, the riskiness of an arbitrage trade ultimately depends on the quality of the hedge, which, in turn, is only as good as the available substitutes.
9. Short-selling constraints include various costs and risks of shorting, as well as legal and institutional restrictions. For example, traders may find it difficult to find a counterpart willing to lend shares to the short seller. In addition, lenders may recall their stock at any time. If the borrower is unable to find another lender, the borrower may be forced to close his position. 10. For a detailed review of the arbitrage risk literature, see Pontiff (2006) .
The availability of close substitutes is largely determined by the level of idiosyncratic risk associated with a security. This may seem counter-intuitive because the CAPM implies that idiosyncratic risk does not matter because of diversification. The systematic part of a stock's total risk, however, can be hedged relatively easily by taking an opposite position in the market index. It is, however, substantially more difficult to find a hedging position if a stock is highly idiosyncratic. Even if arbitrageurs have many projects available that allow diversification, idiosyncratic risk still matters, as is pointed out by Pontiff (2006) . Thus, arbitrageurs may be less inclined to engage in pricecorrecting trades if the mispricing occurs in a highly idiosyncratic stock.
Knowing that prices will deviate more strongly from their fair value if idiosyncratic risk is high, we turn to the question of how arbitrage risk affects the behavior of outsiders trying to mimic directors' dealings. In essence, directors' dealings can be interpreted as public mispricing signals. Disregarding liquidity needs, portfolio rebalancing considerations, and deliberate signaling, rational insiders will only buy (sell) stocks in their own companies if they believe it to be undervalued (overvalued), since insiders put their own wealth at stake.
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If, however, a stock's idiosyncratic volatility is high, outsiders will be less inclined to engage in price-correcting arbitrage trades. As a result, prices will not immediately converge to their new equilibrium level after the announcement of insider transactions, as suggested by the Fama (1970) efficient market hypothesis. Instead, the market will incorporate the information conveyed by insider trading signals slowly into security prices and compounded abnormal returns will increase as longer time periods are considered.
The above discussion does not imply that arbitrage risk eliminates all arbitrage trading activity after reported insider trades in highly idiosyncratic stocks. Pontiff (2006) argues that rational investors will engage in arbitrage trades until the cost of doing so equals the benefits. Thus, our results do not support the notion of a strongly efficient German capital market but satisfy a more sensible version of market efficiency put forward by Jensen (1978) , saying that prices reflect information to the point where the marginal benefit of acting on information does not exceed marginal costs.
DATA

Dataset
We obtain data from BaFin, Thompson Financial Datastream and Worldscope. Dividend adjusted daily closing prices, bid/ask quotations and unadjusted prices are collected from Datastream. As recommended by Ince and Porter (2004) , we carefully screen the data and delete zero returns from dead stocks. In addition, we delete price observation of non-trading days and calculate arithmetic returns. We also use Datastream to obtain trading volume figures and the daily three-month EURIBOR rate. Moreover, we collect several accounting data items, such as the market-to-book ratio and interest coverage figures, from Worldscope.
Data on directors' dealings is obtained from BaFin, which maintains a publicly accessible database. Our study includes all trades reported between 1 July 2002 and 31 October 2007. For this time period, the database contains a total of 18,619 entries. The available data items include, among others, the date of the trade as well as the date of reporting, the full name of the insider, the company, the name and local security code of the traded security, the number of shares traded, the share price, the position of the insider and the type of transaction.
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Since German law requires insiders to report all trades in stock, bonds and other company-related rights, the database also includes option exercises, transactions in derivatives and convertible bonds, and stock allocations due to capital increases. Furthermore, some trades do not lead to a change in the number of stocks held by an insider, for instance a purchase and sale transaction on the same day of equal size, or trading among related insiders, such as a stock transfer to the spouse. We attribute to these transactions no or only limited informational value and, therefore, delete them from our sample.
In addition, we delete all trades in non-German securities. We also discard trades with a transaction size of 1,000 euros or less, since these may be disregarded by the market. In some instances, trades are reported on a weekend or holiday. In these cases, the announcement day is set to the following business day.
Although reporting delays, the number of days between the date of reporting and the date of the actual trade, should, in theory, not exceed five business days, they turn out to be substantial in some cases. Because transactions with extremely long reporting delays could distort our results, we drop all trades with a delay of more than 30 business days from our sample.
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Very often, several trades that were executed on different dates are reported on the same day. Moreover, different insiders from the same company can report trades on the same day. We aggregate such trades for each company 12. We perform various consistency checks utilizing other sources of directors' dealings such as insiderdaten.de, 2iQ Research and company websites to verify the integrity of our dataset. 13. The number of such trades was 83 (37 purchases and 46 sales), i.e. less than 1.7% of all the observations included in our analysis. Nevertheless, we recalculated the abnormal returns reported in four, including all events with a reporting delay of more than 30 business days. It turned out that results were almost unaffected, i.e. the strongest impact was less than 0.1 percentage point. For lack of space we do not further report these results here.
along the reporting day dimension. The trading volume and transaction type are recalculated accordingly. 14 Again, trades with an aggregated transaction volume of less than 1,000 euros are discarded. Because we include the reporting delay as a variable in our cross-sectional regression analysis, we set the trading day to the most recent trading date of the transactions being aggregated.
After these data adjustments, 5,128 transactions (2,782 purchases and 2,346 sales) remain in the sample for the event study analysis in Section 4.2. Because of data unavailability for several of our independent regression variables, the cross-sectional analysis sample in Section 4.4 consists out of 4,796 transactions (2,611 purchases and 2,185 sales).
Construction of variables
The independent variables used in Section 4.4 can be categorized into five (not mutually exclusive) groups: holding costs, transaction costs, trade-, insider-and company-specific variables. The definition of the variables is summarized in Table 1 . In the following, we restrict our comments to those variables that are crucial to our analysis and deserve additional explanation.
As outlined in Section 2, arbitrage risk stems from imperfect hedging. We follow Pontiff (1996) and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) in using a stock's idiosyncratic risk as an empirical proxy for arbitrage risk. The theoretically more vested alternative would be to measure a firm's arbitrage risk as the residual variance from a regression of stock returns on the returns of a close substitute or a basket of close substitutes. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) , however, show that both measures of arbitrage risk are highly correlated (0.98) and yield very similar results.
Therefore, we construct our proxy for arbitrage risk (IRISK) as the residual variance of a market model regression of stock returns on market returns. In particular, we regress the returns of the days t À 261 to t À 21 relative to the reporting day of the insider transaction t 0 against the CDAX performance index. Our results are robust to different lengths of the return windows used to estimate IRISK.
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Because the distribution of IRISK has a high positive skewness and kurtosis, we take the natural logarithm and include the variable IRISKLOG in our regression analysis. In addition, we center IRISKLOG on zero to ease the interpretation of our results. Again, our findings are robust to the inclusion of either IRISK or IRISKLOG. Since we hypothesize that large abnormal returns 14. The transaction volume is summed over the respective trades with a negative sign in the case of sales. If the aggregated volume is greater (smaller) than zero, the transaction type is set equal to an insider purchase (sale). 15. We also compute IRISK with shorter return windows comprising 90 and 180 days. Our crosssectional results, however, prove to be insensitive to these alternative measures of IRISK. 
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after directors' dealings are concentrated in highly idiosyncratic stocks, we expect the coefficient of IRISKLOG to be positive. We also include systematic risk (SYSRSK), which is the part of the volatility of stock returns that can be hedged relatively easily, in our analysis. We compute SYSRSK as the total variance of stock returns minus the variance of the residuals (IRISK). For the same reasons as above, we take the natural logarithm of SYSRSK and center the variable on zero (SYSRSKLOG). This also allows a direct comparison of the coefficients of arbitrage risk and systematic risk.
In practice, systematic risk should also matter to arbitrageurs, although less so than idiosyncratic risk (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between SYSRSKLOG and the dependent CAR variable, but one that is less pronounced than that between excess returns and IRISK.
Following Pontiff (1996) , we also use interest rates as a holding cost item. Specifically, we include the three-month EURIBOR measured one day before the reporting date as proxy for the risk-free rate.
Most empirical studies on directors' dealings ignore transaction costs such as commissions, bid-ask spreads, or illiquidity. Bhushan (1994) and Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) demonstrate that direct transaction costs such as commissions and bid-ask spreads are inversely related to share price. Thus, we include SPRICE, the average (unadjusted) stock price over the days t À 121 to t À 21 in our analysis as a transaction cost item.
Illiquidity in stocks can lead to delays in the processing of orders, which can cause adverse price effects. Therefore, illiquidity poses an indirect transaction cost that is captured by the variable VOLUME (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Bhushan, 1991) . VOLUME is defined as the mean euro trading volume of a company's stock over the days t À 121 to t À 21 . The trading volume data are derived by aggregating the volume of all German stock exchanges on which the respective stock are traded. We expect SPRICE to be positively and VOLUME to be negatively related to post-event CARs.
Additionally, we use several control variables related to the characteristics of insider trades, which are well known from the literature. We use the indicator variable INSALE to account for any differences in the explanatory power of insider purchases and sales. This differential effect has been documented in Seyhun (1986) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) . According to their research, INSALE is set to 1 for sale transactions and is expected to be negatively related to absolute CARs. As additional control variables, we use relative trade size TRADSZ (expected to have a positive influence), reporting delay DELAY (expected to have a negative influence) and a stock's past performance 16 PASTRET (expected to have a negative influence). For the definition of these variables see Table 1. 16. Rozeff and Zaman (1998) demonstrate that abnormal returns after directors' dealings are negatively related with past returns and conclude that insiders follow a well-informed contrarian approach to investing. It might be expected that the quality of information conveyed by a transaction depends on the type of insider who trades (Seyhun, 1986) . Supposedly, members of the executive board possess information superior to that available to members of the supervisory board or the management. Thus, trades by executives should trigger larger price effects. On the other hand, Jeng et al. (2003) propose that better-informed insiders such as chief executive officers refrain from exploiting their comparative advantage because they find themselves subject to increased scrutiny from regulators and the public.
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We capture the effect of an insider's position on abnormal returns with a set of three dummy variables for members of the executive board POSEB, the supervisory board POSSB and the management POSMNG. Transactions executed by other insiders are the base case. If different groups of insiders report their trades on the same day, we set the dummy variable of the presumably best-informed group to one and the others to zero.
Although we expect the coefficients of the dummy variables to be positive, it is difficult to predict their relationships to each other in terms of significance and size.
Finally, as company-specific control variables, we use firm size 17 as measured by the market value of equity MV or its (centered) natural logarithm MVLOG (expected to have a negative influence) and market-to-book ratios MTBV.
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Again, for the specific definition of these variables, see Table 1 .
As an additional firm-specific variable we use financial distress, as firms in poor financial conditions may react more sensitively to insider trading signals than stocks of healthy companies (Fidrmuc et al., 2006) . Purchases in poorly performing firms may indicate that insiders, who supposedly possess superior information, believe that a company turnaround is possible and vice versa. We construct a dummy variable, DISTRS, to examine the relationship between returns to directors' dealings and financial distress. The dummy variable is set to one if the company's interest coverage ratio is below one in the two consecutive years before the reporting date. We define the interest coverage ratio as a firm's earnings before interest and taxes (Ebit) divided by its interest expenses. 19 We expect a positive relationship between our proxy for financial distress and CARs.
Finally, it should be noted that Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Betzer and Theissen (2009) show that a company's ownership structure also influences abnormal returns to reported insider trades. However, we do not integrate 17. Firm size could also pick up transaction cost effects. Schultz (1983) and Stoll and Whaley (1983) , for example, show that there is a negative monotonic relationship between firm size and the bid-ask spread. 18. We exclude any observations where MTBV is negative, zero or greater than 15. 19. Theory suggests the use of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (Ebitda) instead of Ebit. Rajan and Zingales (1995) , however, document that the two measures are highly correlated. Furthermore, Jostarndt and Sautner (2007) argue that the use of Ebit as the nominator is more appropriate for the German market because, in recent years, many firms have defaulted as a result of unexpectedly high depreciations of goodwill.
ownership variables in our analysis as this paper is mainly focused on the impact of arbitrage risk. Table 2 contains summary statistics for the cross-sectional regression sample consisting of a total of 4,796 observations. For completeness, we also provide a breakdown of statistics for purchases and sales only. Our (unlogged) proxy variable for arbitrage risk, IRISK, has a mean value of 0.0012. At 0.0001, the average systematic risk is considerably smaller. This is consistent with the notion that a stock's total volatility is primarily determined by its level of idiosyncratic risk. The average relative trade size is at 1.375% (median 0.03 %) markedly higher for sales than for purchases at 0.45% (median 0.08%). Our sample also displays significant differences between sales and purchases in the case of past returns. Mean (market-adjusted) abnormal returns before purchases is À 0.51% but À 8.49% for purchases. 52.7% of the reported trades involved transactions by members of the executive board. The average firm in our sample has a market value of common equity of 2,926 (median 98) million euros and a market-to-book ratio of 2.56 (median 1.92). A relatively large proportion of insider trades, 11.41%, take place in financially distressed firms. Table 3 displays the correlation coefficients of selected variables. 20 Idiosyncratic risk is negatively correlated with firm size and stock trading volume, which could imply that arbitrage risk clusters in small and thinly traded stocks.
Descriptive statistics
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Event study analysis and cross-sectional dependence
We use the market model to compute cumulative (average) abnormal returns. We hereby follow the framework proposed by Campbell et al. (1997) and MacKinlay (1997) . Our event window is composed of 41 days centered on the event date t 0 , which is defined as the announcement day of insider transactions. For each security i, the abnormal return on day t f AR i;t is given as the difference of the realized return minus the expected return as predicted by the market model. 21 Under the null hypothesis, these market model-based 20. With one exception (VOLUME À MVLOG), correlation coefficients do not indicate any problem of multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) reported in the regression analysis, however, are in any case below 5. Hence, multicollinearity should not be an issue. 21. We generally employ arithmetic returns for all of our return measures. As Dissanaike and Le Fur (2003) point out, logarithmic returns may not be well specified if a study's aim is to test whether events are persistently associated with excess returns. For the market model estimations, we regress e R i;t on the market return e R m;t during the estimation period lasting from t À 201 to t À 21 . We use the CDAX, a broad value-weighted German performance index, as a proxy for the market portfolio. Although the above test statistic is well specified if the variance of average abnormal returns is estimated correctly, event-time clustering renders the underlying independence assumption for abnormal returns in the crosssection invalid (cf. Bernard, 1987; Collins and Dent, 1984) . We address this issue in two ways. First, we compute the non-parametric rank test proposed by Corrado (1989) , which is robust in the presence of non-normality, infrequent trading and event-induced variance, as shown by Campbell and Wesley (1993) . Moreover, we construct a second sample that contains only trades of companies with no other trades in the time window ranging from t À 10 to t þ 10 . This control sample is about half the size of the unadjusted dataset and consists of a total of 1,688 transactions (828 purchases and 860 sales). Our results are not substantially altered by this adjustment and, therefore, subsequently not reported.
Market Efficiency Reloaded
Second, we use a more sophisticated approach in order to address potential cross-sectional correlation between observations with any time overlap by applying a joint generalized least squares ( JGLS) estimation. 24 For that purpose, we estimate abnormal returns directly via the equation
, where d i;t is an indicator variable set equal to one, if the observation date t is an event date and zero otherwise. By putting no restrictions on the structure of the covariance matrix of disturbances -with the exception of assuming no autocorrelation -we allow for cross-sectional correlation. For testing the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns, we use a t-test according to the robustness results provided by Malatesta (1986) .
Event returns
Abnormal returns for different event windows are reported in Table 4 . While we concentrate on post-event CAARs in the subsequent analysis, we also report pre-event excess returns to facilitate comparability with previous studies. Figures 1 and 2 depict abnormal returns over time.
In Panel A of Table 4 , we report abnormal returns under the market model approach. Pre-event abnormal returns from t À 20 to t À 1 accumulate to À 2.51% (1.95%) for purchases (sales) compared with a post-event CAAR(0; 20) of 1.99% (À 3.12%). This confirms the results of previous studies that insiders 22 . Note that for N securities, the cross-sectional average abnormal return for day t is g AAR t ¼ Malatesta (1986) and further developed by Ingram and Ingram (1993) and others. are able to time their transactions well and decide to trade after a period of significant abnormal returns. Moreover, the market seems to react more strongly to the announcement of insider sales. Although studies for the US and UK stock markets have consistently found greater abnormal returns to purchases than to sales, this result confirms the findings of previous studies for the German market. Rau (2004) , Betzer and Theissen (2009) and Klinge et al. (2005) all find the market's reaction to be more pronounced to sales than to purchases, at least over longer event windows. On the event day, the market reacts in the expected direction. CAAR(0) amounts to 0.22% (significant) for purchase and À 0.10% (not significant) for sale transactions. 25 In relation to CAAR(0; 10) and CAAR(0; 20), however, the 
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market's immediate reaction to reported insider trades on the event date t 0 is relatively small. At a first glance, this suggests that the price discovery after the announcement of corporate dealings is inefficient and slow, which should open up the opportunity for outsiders to profit from reported insider trades. In fact, the academic as well as the practitioner-oriented literature is pointing in this direction. In this paper, however, we argue that these results may be in accordance with the view of an informational efficient market as proposed by Jensen (1978) , because it is not clear whether these price adjustment patterns can really be exploited by outside investors. Therefore, in the remaining part of the paper, we will first show that observed abnormal returns are clustered among stocks with high arbitrage risk and, second, that this effect cannot be exploited once transaction costs are taken into account. It should be noted that event returns are almost unchanged -with respect to size as well as significance -if they are calculated under the JGLS approach explained in the preceding section, as can be seen from Panel B of Table 4 .
CAARs for arbitrage risk portfolios
This section analyzes CAARs for different levels of arbitrage risk by sorting trades into quintiles, according to the level of idiosyncratic risk of the underlying stock. This procedure is repeated for all trades and for purchases and sales only.
26 Quintile 1 contains trades associated with lowest arbitrage risk and quintile 5 contains trades with highest arbitrage risk as measured by our proxy variable IRISK. In addition, we compare the CAARs of both quintiles by the means of a one-sided test of difference in means. Results are reported in Table 5 .
Excess returns after directors' dealings prove to be highly sensitive to the level of arbitrage risk. The difference in CAARs is, in all instances, highly significant at the 1% level and ranges in the pooled sample from 1.77% for CAAR(0; 5) to 4.90% for CAAR(0; 20). The greatest difference can be observed for sales with a spread of 6.09% in CAAR(0; 20). It is also shown in Table 5 that results, i.e. differences in CAARs between the high and low arbitrage risk quintile, are almost unchanged, if instead of the traditional market modelbased CAARs, abnormal returns resulting from a JGLS approach are used.
In general, the difference in returns is larger for sales than for purchases. This implies a stronger relationship between arbitrage risk and excess returns in the case of sales than in the case of purchases. This finding will be confirmed in the cross-sectional regression analysis in Section 4.4. In addition, our results demonstrate that returns accumulate over time in highly idiosyncratic stocks but remain more or less constant if arbitrage risk is low. In fact, CAAR(0; 20) is smaller than CAAR(0; 10) in the low arbitrage risk purchases sample, while the opposite is true in all the high arbitrage risk samples. These findings are consistent with the notion that prices adjust slowly if arbitrage forces are 26. In case of aggregating sales and purchases, abnormal returns of sales are multiplied by À 1. 
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Cross-sectional regression analysis
This Section examines the relationship between arbitrage risk and returns to reported insider trades by means of a cross-sectional regression. Because of higher explanatory power as indicated by adjusted R 2 , we focus on CAR(0; 10) and CAR(0; 20) as dependent variables. For both CAR variables, we run a pooled regression as well as one for purchases and sales only. To accommodate the interpretation of our results, abnormal returns after sales are multiplied by minus one. Thus, coefficients should be of the same sign regardless of the examined regression model. As outlined in the discussion of variables in Section 3.2, the analysis includes proxies for holding and transaction costs as well as trade-, insider-and company-specific variables. A summary of the independent regression variables can be found in Table 1 . Regression results are reported in Table 6 .
In support of our previous results, we find that arbitrage risk is strongly and positively related with post-event CARs. IRISKLOG is significant in all regression models at the 5% level at least. Moreover, arbitrage risk has a substantial effect on post-event CARs as indicated by its regression coefficient. Furthermore, we can induce from the regression results that the relevance of arbitrage risk strengthens as longer event windows are being considered. T-statistics as well as regression coefficients increase with time. This is consistent with arbitrage risk being a form of holding cost that is proportional to the investment horizon, as pointed out by Pontiff and Schill (2001) .
Regarding the effect of systematic risk on CARs, we find marked differences between sales and purchases. Although systematic risk is significant and positive in our purchase samples, it has no effect on CARs in the case of reported insider sales. For both types of transactions, however, the influence of systematic risk is smaller than that of idiosyncratic risk. These findings partly confirm that while both systematic and idiosyncratic risk matter to arbitrageurs, the latter part of total volatility matters more because it is more difficult to hedge.
The short-term risk-free rate, another holding cost item, does not have a significant impact on abnormal returns. Along similar lines, we fail to find a statistically significant relationship between CARs and transaction costs. Nevertheless, the regression coefficients of the share price variable, which controls for direct transaction costs such as brokerage commission, have the expected positive sign. The same applies for VOLUME, which picks up indirect transaction costs such as illiquidity, in the case of the purchase and pooled samples.
Our event study analysis has shown that reported insider sales are followed by greater abnormal returns than insider purchases. Our results for the pooled S. Dickgiesser and C. Kaserer Notes: This table presents results for the cross-sectional (OLS) regressions with market model based CAR(0; 10) and CAR(0; 20) as dependent variables. Definitions of the regressors, which include holding cost, transaction cost and trade-, insider-and company-specific variables, can be found in Table 1 . The pooled sample consists of all transactions, whereby the CARs on sales are multiplied by À 1. CARs of insider sales are multiplied by minus one. VIF stands for variance inflation factor. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. regressions, however, demonstrate that the type of transaction has no direct effect on CARs. As a consequence, our event study results must be driven by other factors such as more extreme past returns associated with sales. Several other trade-specific variables have a higher explanatory power. The relative size of trades is significant and positive for purchases. This suggests that relatively larger trades trigger larger price reactions. The negative TRADSZ coefficient for sales, however, suggests the contrary. Betzer and Theissen (2008a) find the same unexpected result. Also in accordance with their findings, we find no significant impact of reporting delay on CARs. Past returns, on the other hand, are powerful in explaining returns to insider trading. As expected, past stock performance is negatively related to postevent CARs.
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Although Lin and Howe (1990) and Seyhun (1986) partially confirm this hypothesis for US data, Betzer and Theissen (2008a) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find no evidence for the UK and German markets. Our results also offer no support for the informational hypothesis. Overall, trades by members of the executive board are followed by smaller (absolute) abnormal returns than transactions by members of the supervisory board or the management.
Firm size has the expected effect on abnormal returns following directors' dealings. The negative regression coefficients suggest that CARs shrink as larger companies are considered. Previous studies generally find corresponding evidence (cf. Betzer and Theissen, 2009; Seyhun, 1986) .
The relationship between the market-to-book value ratio and abnormal returns is significant but has different economic implications for sales and purchases. Value stocks, as measured by a low MTBV ratio, are followed by smaller price movements in the case of sales and larger movements in the case of purchases. The reverse is true for insider trades in high growth or overvalued stocks as measured by a high MTBV ratio. Thus, positive insider trading signals move stock prices less if valuations are already exceedingly high. Market participants seem, however, to be more sensitive to negative signals in high growth stocks as these securities may be associated with greater risk.
The market's response to purchases and sales also differs for companies in financial distress. If a firm's interest coverage ratio is below one, positive purchasing signals are met with caution and abnormal returns are smaller than otherwise. Sales, on the other hand, convey an additional negative signal for a company already in jeopardy. Accordingly, prices react more extremely, and absolute abnormal returns are higher. Except for the pooled models, the regression coefficients for financial distress are significant.
Finally, it should be noted that results reported in Table 6 are almost unchanged, if instead of the market model based CARs, JGLS-based CARs would be used as dependent variable. This is true not only with respect to the size of the estimated regression coefficients but also with respect to their 27. Klinge et al. (2005) finds similar results for the German market. significance level. For reasons of space, we do not report these results here. This confirms, once again, that results are not significantly affected by potential cross-correlation of observed abnormal returns.
Arbitrage trading strategy
The cross-sectional regression analysis confirms the existence of a statistically significant relationship between arbitrage risk and abnormal returns following directors' dealings. On the basis of this result, however, we cannot decide whether signals conveyed by insider trades can be exploited by outside investors. Therefore, we further investigate in this Section the relevance of arbitrage risk by constructing a straightforward arbitrage trading strategy based on directors' dealings. By comparing the returns with the trading strategy depending on the underlying level on idiosyncratic risk and by adjusting for transaction costs, we are able to draw conclusions regarding the impact of arbitrage risk on arbitrage opportunities.
We start by designing a zero-investment arbitrage trading strategy as follows: insider purchases (sales) are mimicked by taking a long (short) position in the company's stock on the day of the announcement. To hedge the associated market risk of the stock investment, an opposite position in the CDAX index is taken.
28 After 20 trading days, both positions are liquidated. 29 We calculate the average returns to the trading strategy using dividend adjusted closing prices, and also employ actual bid/ask quotations in order to account for transaction costs. 30 It should be noted that several thinly traded stocks exhibit extremely large bid/ask spreads. Once again, for the sake of making our analysis as conservative as possible, we exclude all trades with a bid/ask spread of 10% or more on the announcement day, as a sophisticated investor would probably not invest in such stocks.
In a first step, we weight all trades equally; in addition to total returns we also report separately the average returns to the stock investment and the hedging position. Results based on the whole research period from 1 July 2002 to 31 October 2007 are outlined in Table 7 . Disregarding transaction costs, i.e. calculating the returns on the basis of closing prices, the arbitrage trading strategy yields a significant positive return in 11 out of 15 trading 28. Since the CDAX is a broad index covering all German shares admitted to the Prime and General Standard, there are no investment instruments, and thus no shorting instruments, available to the general public yet. Thus, this can be regarded as a conservative setting for testing arbitrage opportunities. 29. As a side note, the reader should note that the following results are not significantly altered if instead of a 20-day trading period a 40-day period would be used. Results are not reported for lack of space. 30. The bid/ask spread is only one element of direct transaction costs, which also include brokerage commissions and additional costs for short selling. By omitting these additional costs we again make our analysis more conservative. The trading strategy in every arbitrage risk quintile is defined as follows: insider purchases (sales) are mimicked by taking a long (short) position in the company's stock on the day of the announcement. The fundamental risk associated with the investment is hedged with an opposite position in the CDAX index. Trades associated with a bid/ask spread of 10% or more on the day of the announcement are disregarded. After 20 trading days, both positions are liquidated. All trades are equally weighted. Whether the return difierence between the highest arbitrage risk quintile and the lowest arbitrage risk quintile is larger than zero is tested by a one-sided test of difierence in means. The average return of single quintile trading strategies is tested by a one-sided t-test. The reader should note that the result given in row 'Difference Q5 À Q1' is not always equal to the difference of the numbers given in the rows 'Arbitrage risk Q5' and 'Arbitrage risk Q1'. This is due to a rounding error. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. strategies taken into consideration. Moreover, the return difference between the highest arbitrage risk quintile and the lowest arbitrage risk quintile is also significant at a 5% level, at least. More specifically, for the pooled sample, the return difference is 2.41% (significant at the 1% level), while for the sample of purchases, the return difference even increases to 3.20% (significant at the 1% level). For the sample of sales, however, the return difference is only 1.64% (significant at the 5% level). These observations confirm our previous finding that highly idiosyncratic stocks are associated with larger post-event returns. By taking the bid/ask spreads into account, however, we see that the results totally change. None of the 15 trading strategies generates a significant return any more. Moreover, also the return difference between the highest arbitrage risk quintile and the lowest arbitrage risk quintile is not significant any more, and in two out of three cases even not positive. This finding is consistent with the notion that idiosyncratic risk makes trading in a stock more costly. Although a clear cut proof of the link between the level of idiosyncratic risk and the bid/ask spread is beyond the scope of this paper, our results show that no excess profits are obtainable from an arbitrage trading strategy based on reported insider trades. This, however, does not mean that information about insider trades is valueless for all investors. For instance, long-term investors, as mutual funds, may use this information for the timing of their investment decisions. In this case, transaction costs are almost irrelevant as these investors would invest their funds on the stock market anyhow.
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It may be interesting to see whether these results are stable over time. For that purpose, we split our observation period in two parts such that the number of observations is almost equal in both subperiods. Results are reported in Tables 8 and 9 . By and large, it could be said that results do not change to a large extent. However, there is one important insight that should be emphasized here. It seems that the profitability of the zero-investment trading strategy has decreased over time. Based on closing prices, ten out of 15 trading strategies are profitable in the first subperiod, while in the second this ratio goes down to five out of 15. Also, the return difference between the highest arbitrage risk quintile and the lowest arbitrage risk quintile is notably larger in the first subperiod compared with the second subperiod, at least for the trading strategies based on all trades and on purchases. This is also true, if trading strategy returns taking bid/ask spreads into account are considered. By taking transaction costs into account, profitability in most cases is not significant any more, although it should be said that in the first subperiod four out of 15 strategies generate significant positive returns and the return difference for purchases between the highest arbitrage risk quintile and the lowest arbitrage risk quintile is equal to 2.40% and significant at the 5% level. In the second subperiod, however, only two out of 15 trading strategies are profitable. To sum up, these findings give some indications that the profitability of trading strategies based on the announcement of insider transactions has decreased over time, probably because some institutional insider purchases (sales) are mimicked by taking a long (short) position in the company's stock on the day of the announcement. The fundamental risk associated with the investment is hedged with an opposite position in the CDAX index. Trades associated with a bid/ask spread of 10% or more on the day of the announcement are disregarded. After 20 trading days, both positions are liquidated. All trades are equally weighted. Whether the return difference between the highest arbitrage risk quintile and the lowest arbitrage risk quintile is larger than zero is tested by a onesided test of difference in means. The average return of single quintile trading strategies is tested by a one-sided t-test. The reader should note that the result given in row 'Difference Q5 À Q1' is not always equal to the difference of the numbers given in the rows 'Arbitrage risk Q5' and 'Arbitrage risk Q1'. This is due to a rounding error. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. investors have become active in this field over the last years. However, it is important to note that even in the first subperiod our results clearly show that, at least for sales, no profitable trading strategy could be implemented, once transaction costs are taken into account.
In a second step, we look at the results of value weighted trade portfolios. At a first glance, one could argue that high arbitrage risk firms might tend to have lower market capitalization. If this is the case, the results reported above would clearly indicate that the profitability of such a value-weighted trading strategy should be smaller than that of an equally weighted strategy. However, as reported in Table 3 , there is only a small negative correlation between a firm's idiosyncratic risk (as a proxy for arbitrage risk) and its market capitalization. Hence, looking at the returns of a value weighted investment strategy could generate additional insights. Results are reported in Table 10 . Interestingly, if we look at returns calculated on the basis of closing prices, the return difference between the highest arbitrage risk quintile and the lowest arbitrage risk quintile is almost unchanged with respect to the equally weighted investment strategy, although the significance level is lower in all three cases (-10%). Nevertheless, looking at the single investment strategies for the different arbitrage risk quintiles reveals that profitability in this case disappears even if transactions costs are neglected. In fact, only three out of 15 investment strategies generate a significant positive return. Therefore, it is not surprising that once transaction costs are taken into account, profitability almost totally disappears (only one out of 15 strategies generate a positive return significant at the 10% level).
CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the question of whether outside investors can profit from reported insider transactions in the German market, since previous studies find large abnormal returns after published directors' dealings. Any trading strategy based upon publicly available information and yielding excess returns would, however, constitute a serious violation of the efficient market hypothesis. We argued that observed post-event price effects in the context of directors' dealings do not constitute evidence against the efficient market hypothesis, at least according to the definition put forward by Jensen (1978) . In fact, we show that this effect is not fully exploitable within a zeroinvestment trading strategy due to arbitrage risk. Specifically, we hypothesized that large abnormal returns cluster in highly idiosyncratic stocks that are associated with considerable arbitrage risk, making it very costly for outsiders to take advantage of the slow price adjustment.
While our event study analysis reiterated the existence of large abnormal returns in the range of 1.46-3.12% after the announcement of insider transactions, our arbitrage risk portfolio analysis demonstrated that highly idiosyncratic stocks yield significantly larger post-event abnormal returns S. Dickgiesser and C. Kaserer insider purchases (sales) are mimicked by taking a long (short) position in the company's stock on the day of the announcement. The fundamental risk associated with the investment is hedged with an opposite position in the CDAX index. Trades associated with a bid/ask spread of 10% or more on the day of the announcement are disregarded. After 20 trading days, both positions are liquidated. All trades are weighted according to the market capitalization of the respective firm on the announcement day. Whether the return difference between the highest arbitrage risk quintile and the lowest arbitrage risk quintile is larger than zero is tested by a one-sided test of difference in means. The average return of single quintile trading strategies is tested by a one-sided t-test. The reader should note that the result given in row 'Difference Q5-Q1' is not always equal to the difference of the numbers given in the rows 'Arbitrage risk Q5' and 'Arbitrage risk Q1'. This is due to a rounding error. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. than stocks associated with low arbitrage risk. In fact, the return difference between the quintiles with highest and lowest idiosyncratic risk is in the range of 2.99-4.90% and highly significant. In addition, the speed of price adjustment proves to be much faster if arbitrage risk is low. The robustness of this positive relationship between abnormal returns and arbitrage risk is verified in the cross-sectional analysis that controls for other factors potentially influencing excess returns. We find that besides arbitrage risk, only very few other factors, such as systematic risk, past returns and the market-to-book ratio, have a significant impact on excess returns.
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The implementation of a zero-investment trading strategy based on the announcement of directors' dealings also shows that outsiders will hardly be able to profit from reported insider transactions. It turns out that such a trading strategy in most of the cases generates significant positive returns as long as transaction costs are neglected. These returns, again, are highest for the stocks with highest arbitrage risk. In fact, the investment strategy in the highest arbitrage risk quintile generates a significant outperformance of 2.41% of the assumed long position for all trade types. However, the outperformance totally disappears in all risk quintiles, if bid/ask spreads are taken into account. Finally, we present some weak evidence that the profitability of such a zero-investment trading strategy has decreased over time.
Our results are consistent with the notion that highly idiosyncratic stocks are difficult to hedge, impeding arbitrageurs from engaging in pricecorrecting trades. This results in a slow price discovery and large post-event excess returns. While arbitrage risk certainly does not eliminate all arbitrage trading, the costs stemming from arbitrage risk reduce the threshold of economic feasibility and thus the quantity and intensity of such trades.
In summary, this paper provides evidence that the German stock market is efficient in the sense that prices reflect publicly available information to the point where the marginal benefit of acting on information exceeds marginal costs. 
